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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of The Case
Petitioner/Appellant Jarrett Vann (“Vann”), an in-state pro se inmate, appeals from

the District Court’s Opinion on Appeal, which affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s award of
summary judgment to Respondent L.R. Wilmoth (“Wilmoth”) and dismissal of Vann’s
petition for habeas corpus. At issue in this appeal is the Idaho Commission of Pardons and
Parole’s (the “Parole Commission”) decision on June 14, 2012 to revoke Vann’s parole and
return him to prison without credit for 312 days spent on parole, including time when Vann
was in federal custody on a separate matter. Wilmoth, a Sentencing Specialist employed by
the Idaho Department of Correction (“IDOC”), merely confirmed the sentence calculation
required by the Parole Commission’s decision. The material facts are not in dispute. As a
matter of law, the Opinion on Appeal was correctly decided and should be upheld.
B.

Procedural History
In the Opinion on Appeal, the Honorable Gerald F. Schroeder, Senior District Judge,

noted that this habeas proceeding is the second state court proceeding in which Vann has
demanded a credit against his prison sentence for time spent on parole. Addressing Vann’s
prior request for credit in his state criminal case, Judge Schroeder stated:
The petitioner filed a motion for credit for time served in the state
criminal case. That motion was denied and the denial was affirmed on
appeal. See State v. Vann, 2016 WL 324787 (Id. Ct. App.). In its affirmance,
the Idaho Court of Appeals noted “Vann filed a motion for credit for time
served for time he spent in federal custody on an unrelated case while he was
on parole in this case.” 2016 WL 324787 at *1. That decision would appear
to have adjudicated this issue with this petitioner, but it is an unpublished
opinion. So this Court will analyze the case as presented to it.
1

(R. pp. 414–415.)

See also State v. Vann, 2016 WL 324787, 1 (Ct. App. 2016)

(unpublished) (holding that pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-309 Vann was not entitled to
credit for time spent in federal custody on an unrelated case while he was on parole).
Vann filed this habeas proceeding on August 15, 2016. The Order on Appeal
summarized the proceeding before the Magistrate Judge as follows:
On August 15, 2016, the appellant, an in-state prisoner, filed a
petition seeking habeas relief from the forfeiture of the time that he was on
parole. Initially the magistrate entered a judgment and order dismissing the
petition. The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration which the
magistrate granted, vacating the order of dismissal. The magistrate ordered
service of the petition on the respondent. Thereafter the respondent filed a
motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment, which was subsequently
granted.
(R. p. 414; see also R. pp. 5–23 and 36–304.) The Magistrate Judge’s decision entered
on January 6, 2017 (R. pp. 295–305) is supported by the undisputed facts, including
evidence offered by Wilmoth on Vann’s parole history (R. pp. 70–95), IDOC’s sentence
calculation (R. pp. 96–99), Vann’s state criminal conviction and incarceration
(R. pp. 101–122) and his federal criminal conviction and incarceration (R. pp. 123–156).
Vann moved for reconsideration and clarification of the judgment, but the
Magistrate Judge denied that motion. (R. pp. 306–314 and 326–328.) In the meantime,
Vann

appealed

the

Magistrate

Judge’s

decision

to

the

District

Court

on

February 17, 2017, and both parties submitted briefing. (R. pp. 311–314 and 342–412.)
On August 10, 2017, Judge Schroeder issued the Opinion on Appeal, upholding
the Magistrate Judge’s award of summary judgment to Wilmoth. (R. pp. 413–424.)
On September 18, 2017, Vann filed the Notice of Appeal. (R. pp. 425–429.)
2

C.

Statement of Undisputed Facts
In the Opinion on Appeal, Judge Schroeder provides the following summary of facts:
According to the petition for habeas corpus relief the petitioner was on
supervised release in federal case no.1:01-CR00029-001-BLW, when he
committed the state offense case no. CR-2007—26437C. On May 10, 2008,
he was sentenced in the state case to a ten-year prison term with the first three
years fixed and the remaining seven years indeterminate. This sentence was
to run concurrent with any other sentence being served. On October 22, 2010,
he was paroled to federal custody where he was given a ten-month (10)
sentence for violating federal supervision release by committing the state
offense, CR-2007-26437C.
According to the petitioner he was released to serve dual terms of
supervision, state parole and federal supervised release on August 19, 2011,
for a state parole violation. The parole board ordered that he serve his full
time and forfeit the time from October 22, 2010 to August 30, 2011.

(R. p. 414; see also R. pp. 6–8.) This summary is confirmed by the record. (R. pp. 70–156.)
In revoking parole without credit for time spent on parole, the Parole Commission
cited concerns for public safety including that Vann was found working on a 108-page child
erotica book at a library, shortly after his release from federal custody. (R. pp. 72–73 ¶ 11,
p. 94.) Both Vann’s state and criminal felony convictions are for sex offenses, and he
committed the Idaho offense while on federal probation. (Id., see also R. pp. 6, 71–72
¶¶ 5–10, pp. 81–94, p. 102 ¶ 3, pp. 107–108 and 123–128.)
As dictated by the Parole Commission’s decision, IDOC recalculated Vann’s full
term release date to be August 31, 2018, without credit for time spent on parole.
(R. pp. 104–105 ¶¶ 12–14, pp. 119–122.) Wilmoth, an IDOC Sentencing Specialist,
merely confirmed this sentence calculation in a memorandum, dated April 13, 2016, sent
in response to an inquiry by Vann. (R. pp. 96–100.) The next month, in May 2016, the
3

Parole Commission confirmed in a memorandum to Vann that Idaho Code § 20-228 was
the statutory basis for its decision to deny credit. (R. p. 73 ¶ 12, p. 95.)
ISSUES PRESENTED
Respondent restates the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in affirming summary

judgment for Wilmoth and the dismissal of Vann’s petition for habeas corpus, where
Idaho Code § 20-228 expressly denies any credit for time on parole unless the
Commission exercises its statutory discretion to grant credit for time on parole.
2.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in in affirming summary

judgment for Wilmoth and the dismissal of Vann’s petition for habeas corpus on the
alternative basis that the current sentence calculation for Vann does not exceed any
maximum allowed by law. 1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus is reviewed on appeal for
abuse of discretion. Quinlan v. Idaho Com’n for Pardons and Parole, 138 Idaho 726,
729, 69 P.3d 146, 149 (2003). In reviewing an exercise of discretion in a habeas corpus
proceeding, the appellate court conducts “a three-tiered inquiry to determine whether the
1

In his Appellant’s Brief, Vann also asserts, “Any other presented in the Appellant’s
Brief to the District Court that the Court will allow.” (Appellant’s Brief, p. 8.) But, this
vague reference to anything that he may have asserted in a brief below does not satisfy
Rule 35(a)(4) of the Idaho Appellate Rules, which requires that an appellant’s statement
of the issues on appeal “shall fairly state the issues presented for review.”
I.A.R. 35(a)(4). Thus, Vann has waived any additional issue on appeal. See Weisel v.
Beaver Springs Owners Ass’n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 525, 272 P.3d 491, 497 (2012) (Rule
35(a)(4) “provides that an appellant’s failure to include in his initial appellate brief a fair
statement of an issue presented for review results in waiver of the issue”).
4

lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries
of such discretion, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Gibson v. Bennett,
141 Idaho 270, 273, 108 P.3d 417, 420 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Brennan v. State, 122
Idaho 911, 914, 841 P.2d 441, 444 (Ct. App.1992). If the appellant is not entitled to
relief, the lower court’s decision to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing is
upheld. Id. (citing Brennan, 122 Idaho at 917, 841 P.2d at 447).
A summary judgment award is reviewed de novo. See Medical Recovery Services,
LLS v Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc., 2013 WL 204744, *1 (Ct. App. 2013)
(citing Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B.V., 148 Idaho 89, 101, 218 P.3d 1150, 1162
(2009)). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues
of material fact, and disputed facts and reasonable inferences are construed in favor of the
nonmoving party.

This Court exercises free review over issues of law.

Summary

judgment is properly upheld if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Soigner v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 326,
256 P.3d 730, 734 (2011). Citing the standard of review for summary judgment, Judge
Schroeder stated, here: “The record reveals no issues of material fact.” (R. p. 416.)
ARGUMENT
A.

Summary Judgment for Wilmoth Should Be Affirmed Because Pursuant to Idaho
Code § 20-228 Time Spent on Parole Is Not Credited Against a Sentence Where,
As Here, the Parole Commission Has Not Exercised Its Discretion to Grant Credit
for Time on Parole.
The District Court correctly held that it was up to the Parole Commission—not the

sentencing judge—to decide whether or not to credit time spent on parole against Vann’s
5

remaining sentence following the revocation of parole, regardless of whether Vann was
in federal custody during his state parole. Judge Schroeder soundly reasoned:
The petitioner asserts the state sentence and the federal sentence ran
concurrent. The appellant committed a parole violation while he was still
serving his state sentence. Pursuant to I.C. § 20-228, it was up to the Parole
Commission and not the sentencing judge, whether or not the time the
petitioner was on parole was forfeited, whether he was in federal custody or
not, so long as he was not in custody pursuant to an agent’s or commission
warrant related to his state sentence, which he was not. The appellant
cannot avail himself of any relief pursuant to the Parole Commission rule,
since it requires receipt of incarceration credit “during the parole period
(when) such incarceration was on an agent’s warrant and/or commission
warrant(.)” IDAPA 50.01.01.400.11.b. That is not the situation here.
While the state sentencing judge may have intended the state and
federal sentences to run concurrently, that judge would have no authority or
say in whether or not the time the petitioner spent on parole was forfeited in
the event his parole time was forfeited after revocation. That authority,
pursuant to I.C. § 20-228, is vested solely in the discretion of the Parole
Commission.
(R. p. 421.)
On appeal, Vann argues that Idaho law makes no difference in allowing or not
allowing credit for time spent in federal custody on his federal violation sentence.
(Appellant’s Brief, p. 6.) Instead, Vann argues that the state court judge’s intent and what
she ordered regarding concurrent sentences is the only thing that matters. (Id.)
But, Vann’s contention is flatly contradicted by the plain text of Idaho Code
§ 20-228. The statute states that, upon a revocation of parole, the offender “must serve
out the sentence, and the time during which such prisoner was out on parole shall not be
deemed a part thereof, unless the commission, in its discretion, shall determine otherwise.
. . .” Idaho Code § 20-228.
6

In Gibson v. Bennett, the Idaho Court of Appeals interpreted Idaho Code § 20-228
and held: “When an inmate’s parole is revoked, the time spent on parole does not count
towards the completion of an inmate’s sentence, unless the Commission for Pardons and
Parole decides in its discretion that the time should be so counted.” Gibson, 141 Idaho at
273–74, 108 P.3d at 420–21 (citing Idaho Code § 20–228).
Here, the Parole Commission exercised restraint in its statutory discretion under
Idaho Code § 20-228 when it purposefully denied Vann credit for time spent on parole
from October 22, 2010 (the date of his parole) through August 30, 2011 (the date of his
arrest on the agent’s warrant). (R. p. 414; see also R. pp. 103–104 ¶¶ 6, 10 and 13, pp.
112–113 and 119–121.) Concerned that Vann was a “danger to the community,” the
Parole Commission supported its decision at the parole revocation hearing as follows:
The Commission elects to deny parole and pass the subject to his/her
full term release date. The subject will receive no credit for the time he/she
was on parole and will forfeit time 10/22/10 – 8/30/11 (312 days). Subject
entered a library and was found working on a 108-page child erotica book;
he had previously been instructed that libraries were off limits to him.
Subject stated the “book” was his that he started in prison as he had no sex
offender treatment. It is of great concern that his “book” was not taken
from him, as it appears he has had it for quite some time. He was in a
library a very short time after his release from Federal custody (8/19/11).
He was convicted of a Federal probation violation for the same violations
as Idaho’s. Subject is a danger to the community and it seems clear he will
continue with his deviant behavior. . . . (His Federal crime is also for
Receiving Material Involving Exploitation of Minors and he committed the
Idaho offense while on Federal Probation.)
(R. pp. 72–73 ¶ 11, p. 94.)
As Judge Schroeder correctly held, the Parole Commission acted within its

7

statutory discretion when it denied Vann credit for time on parole.2 Judge Schroeder
soundly reasoned: “While the state sentencing judge may have intended the state and
federal sentences to run concurrently, that judge would have no authority or say in
whether or not the time the petitioner spent on parole was forfeited in the event his parole
time was forfeited after revocation. That authority, pursuant to I.C. § 20-228, is vested
solely in the discretion of the Parole Commission.” (R., p. 421.) Also, as the Magistrate
Judge in the proceeding below aptly stated: “The Idaho Legislature has provided the
Commission of Pardons and Paroles with the discretion to determine whether or not the
time spend on parole is forfeited, after parole revocation, . . . whether the parole time is
spent ‘on the street’ or where, as here, the parole time was spent in federal custody
serving a federal sentence.” (R. pp. 301–302.)
Finally, Vann’s reliance on Fullmer v. Collard, 143 Idaho 171, 139 P.3d 773
(2006), is misplaced.

While Fullmer involved a sentence calculation, the sentence

calculation had nothing to do with a parole revocation or Idaho Code § 20-228. U.S.
Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 1505 (1997), also cited by
Vann, is inapposite; it does not address Idaho Code § 20-228 nor even mention Idaho.
Thus, summary judgment for Wilmoth should be upheld in this appeal based upon
the Parole Commission’s statutory discretion under Idaho Code § 20-228 to deny credit
to Vann for time spent on parole, regardless of time spent in federal custody.
2

The District Court also correctly held that the narrow exception for credit while
incarcerated on an agent’s or Parole Commission warrant did not apply. (R. pp. 420–421
[citing IDAPA 50.01.01.400.11]; see also R. pp. 103–104 ¶¶ 6, 10 and 13, pp. 112–113
and 119–121 [documenting the time on parole forfeited].)
8

B.

Summary Judgment for Wilmoth Should Be Affirmed on the Alternative Basis
that the Sentence Calculation Does Not Exceed Any Maximum Permitted by Law.
Alternatively, the District Court correctly held that the sentence calculation for

Vann, which includes the forfeiture of time spent on parole, does not violate the
maximum time permitted by Idaho law. Judge Schroeder concluded:
The petitioner also contends his total sentence is greater than the
maximum allowed.
The petitioner’s sentence has not been illegally extended, because a
prisoner is not entitled to credit against his sentence for the time he spent on
parole. See Gibson, 141 Idaho at 273–74, 108 P.3d at 420–21 (“When an
inmate’s parole is revoked, the time spent on parole does not count towards
the completion of an inmate’s sentence, unless, the Commission for
Pardons and Parole decides in its discretion that the time should be so
counted.”). See also Winter v. State, 117 Idaho 103, 785 P.2d 667 (Ct.
App. 1989).
(R. pp. 421–422.)
On appeal, Vann asserts that his violation of Idaho Code § 18-1507(2)(a) carries a
maximum sentence of ten years, but his current sentence calculation is for ten years and
ten months. Vann argues that his time spent under supervision on parole is time served
and that credit for this time cannot be taken away from him without judicial process.
(Appellant’s Brief, p. 8.)
However, as Judge Schroeder correctly held, Vann’s sentence has not been
illegally extended. Instead, consistent with Idaho Code § 20-228, the Parole Commission
legally withheld credit from him for time spent on parole. (R. pp. 421–422.) This
conclusion is consistent with the plain text of Idaho Code § 20-228, as discussed above in
this brief (supra, Argument, Section A) and is further supported by the case law.
9

Two Idaho cases, Gibson v. Bennett and Winter v. State, are on point. In Gibson,
the offender had two convictions for felony Driving under the Influence. The Idaho
Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of requiring the offender to spend
additional time in custody as the result of a forfeiture of 314 days spent on parole.
Gibson, 141 Idaho at 273–75, 108 P.3d at 420–23.
In Winter, the offender was convicted of first degree burglary. The Idaho Court of
Appeals upheld an increase in the offender’s time in custody from ten to eleven years,
holding that this increase upon a revocation of parole was constitutionally permissible.
Winter v. State, 117 Idaho 103, 104, 106–07, 785 P.2d 667, 668, 670–71 (Ct. App. 1989).
The Court reasoned that Idaho Code § 20-228 “permits the executive branch to retain an
offender after his or her judicially imposed term has expired.” Winter, 117 Idaho at 106,
785 P.2d at 670. Thus, while Vann cites Winter to argue that time on parole is a form of
punishment (Appellant’s Brief, p. 8), Winters actually rejects his contention that credit for
time on parole cannot be denied.
Also, Vann’s reliance on Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2193
(2006) is misplaced. There is no dispute that parole is “on the ‘continuum’ of stateimposed punishments.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 850, 126 S.Ct. at 2198. However, the issue
in Samson was a police search of a parolee in California; the case has nothing to do with
Idaho Code § 20-228 or its application to the facts here. 3

3

Respondent was unable to locate cases erroneously cited in Appellant’s Brief. If the
Court wishes briefing on any other cases, Respondent is ready and willing to provide it.
10

On this basis as well, summary judgment for Wilmoth should be affirmed. As a
matter of law, Vann’s current sentence calculation is consistent with Idaho law. 4
CONCLUSION
The District Court correctly upheld the Magistrate Judge’s decision dismissing
Vann’s petition for habeas relief, as a matter of law. Accordingly, Respondent Wilmoth
respectfully requests that the Court affirm the Opinion on Appeal.
DATED this 14th day of February 2018.
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

/s/ Emily A. Mac Master

EMILY A. MAC MASTER
Deputy Attorney General

4

Before the Magistrate Judge, Wilmoth also moved to dismiss the habeas petition on the
grounds that she had no legal authority to overturn the Parole Commission’s denial of
credit for time spent on parole and that there is no evidence that she miscalculated Vann’s
sentence. (R. pp. 63–64 and 395.) While the District Court did not consider this
alternative ground in the absence of a cross-appeal, respectfully, summary judgment to
Wilmoth may be affirmed on this basis as well. See Noak v. Idaho Department of
Correction, 152 Idaho 305, 310, 271 P.3d 703, 708 (2012) (holding that statute of
limitations issue was properly before the Idaho Supreme Court without a cross-appeal).
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of February 2018, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by the following
method to:
Jarrett Vann
IDOC No. 89584
SICI
P.O. Box 8509
Boise, Idaho 83707

X
____
____
____
____

U.S. Mail, Inmate/Prison Mail Service
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Telecopy
E-mail

Appellant Pro Se

/s/ Emily A. Mac Master

Emily A. Mac Master
Deputy Attorney General
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